

National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual (NFIPM)

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C. The U.S. Government is in the process of evaluating potential counterintelligence issues arising from the adoption of more intrusive verification protocols, and is beginning to carry out training and planning events at potentially inspectable facilities. [REDACTED]

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D. In 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted additional protocols requiring States Parties to the NPT, including nuclear weapons states, to submit expanded data declarations; to permit IAEA inspectors to take environmental samples to detect the presence of undeclared activities at or near declared nuclear sites; and to permit IAEA inspectors access to any place on a declared nuclear facility. The United States signed the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol in 1998; however, it has not yet been ratified. Upon ratification, the United States, as a nuclear weapon state, will voluntarily accept these new measures and provide access as required to declared facilities. The United States may refuse access to locations and information having direct National Security significance.

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